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I 
For many reasons, this should prove to 
be a useful volume for those interested in 
the fallacies. Ii collects together essays by 
two of the most prolific writers In the field, 
pays tribute to their pioneering work. and 
contributes a body of literature which will 
help legitimize a field of study which is only 
now gaining the attention it deserves. I shall 
subsequently argue that there are important 
ways in which one might criticize the 
approach to fallacies that Woods anQ Wal-
ton develop, though it would be a mistake to 
dismiss this collection on that account. 
Every approach is susceptible to criticism 
and the important point is that the book 
raises deep questions about the nature of 
informal logic and argumentation theory 
that need to be discussed-in particular. 
questions about its development as a disci-
pline which is increasingly distinct from 
formal logic. 
Though I cannot pursue a comparison in 
any detail here, it would be interesting to 
contrast the views and opinions one tinds in 
Woods and Walton and those that Trudy 
Govier expounds in her very different con-
tribution to this series ("StUdies of Argu-
mentation in Pragmatics and Discourse 
Analysis"), Problems in Argument Analysis 
and Evaluation. 2 The competing 
approaches to argumentation theory de-
fended in these two books (one favouring, 
one rejecting, a formal approach) should 
helpfully further the dialectic on the ques-
tion how informal logic and argumentation 
theory should develop as a discipline. 
The scope of Woods and Walton's book 
is impressive-almost all the major falla-
cies are discussed-and this should make it 
an important reference point in discussions 
of the fallacies. Its very breadth makes it 
difficult to discuss the book in a general 
way, however, for one thing that does not 
emerge from it is a unified theory of the fal-
lacies. One does find a very general meth-
odology which is repeatedly employed in 
discussing fallacies. many glimpses of how 
one might go about constructing a unified 
theory, and many important insights into the 
nature of specific fallacies. But no compre-
hensive theory is defended. The question 
whether the lack of such a theory is a flaw in 
the anthology is the first issue I want to 
address in thc present study, for it raises 
fruitful ruminations about what the hook is, 
what it is not, and what it might have heen. 
Especially as Woods and Walton are 
very modest in their claims ahout what they 
have accomplished-themselves suggest-
ing that there is no mature theory of the fal-
lacies (p. xvi)-it might he thought that the 
hook's lack of a general theory of the falla-
cies GlI1not he held against it. Questions 
ahout the hook's raison d'etrc cannot. how-
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ever, be so easily dismissed. That we can 
use a book like this is clear enough-at the 
very least, because it is a convenient refer-
ence book for those interested in the 
approach to the fallacies Woods and Walton 
have developed-but it is equally clear that 
it could have been published in a way that 
made it more forceful and useful than it is. 
It is difficult to read the anthology with-
out being struck by the repetitiveness and 
disunity of much of the discussion. The 
same (correct, I think) sentiments about the 
sad state of fallacy theory are expressed 
time and time again and many of Woods and 
Walton's more specific claims are made in a 
variety of articles that repeat rather than 
strengthen the points made. There is no 
attempt to unify the often overlapping treat-
ments of adverecundiam (the subject of two 
chapters), ad hominem (the subject of two 
chapters), petitio principii (the subject of 
six chapters), and composition and division 
(discussed in two chapters), and standard 
views and terms-the Lockean view of ad 
hominem, the formalism used in discussing 
composition and division-are introduced 
more than once. Cross references between 
the chapters give page references for origi-
nal journal articles rather than the present 
book-something which is most annoying 
if one decides to pursue cross references. 
Finally, the text contains many typos and 
misprints, some of them serious (see p. 224, 
e.g.), and does not address important ques-
tions about the relationship between the 
material in different chapters. The approach 
to petitio principii investigated in Chapter 
6, for example, seems beside the point given 
that it is undermined by other chapters that 
convincingly establish that we must adopt 
an epistemic approach to the fallacy, some-
thing that Woods and Walton themselves 
suggest in their concluding remarks} 
These aspects of the book can, to a great 
extent, be excused if it is intended only as a 
convenient collection for historical or for 
reference purposes. Still, one may have 
hoped for more and the reasons Woods and 
Walton give for proceeding in the way they 
do are not entirely convincing. On p. xiii, 
they explain that: 
The papers recur here with minimal adjust-
ment and, so appear with their original 
imperfections, undisturbed by hindsight. 
We do not particularly relish displaying our 
early oversimplifications of complex prob-
lems, but think that doing so is warranted by 
two consideration[sl. First, some of the 
oversimplifications are instructive, and, sec-
ond, arranged in their pristine form, the 
papers will show, with some accuracy, a cer-
tain development in our views of the falla-
cies and our methods for dealing with them. 
The "certain development" in Woods and 
Walton's views referred to here is not, how-
ever, obvious, and one wishes that it were 
made so. Nor is it clear why a careful 
reworking of the essays in the book would 
weaken the other features of the book that 
Woods and Walton think important. There 
is, for example, no reason why reworked 
versions of the essays could not begin with 
the oversimplifications they refer to, dis-
cuss why they are so and then move on to a 
more sophisticated analysis. 
Coupled with the elimination of the 
repetitiveness and disunity that characterize 
the book, such a rewriting would have 
added greatly to the finished product. If, as 
Woods and Walton say, the chapters of the 
book appear with imperfections and over-
simplifications they know to be so, it seems 
entirely appropriate that the original articles 
be "disturbed" by hindsight or at least 
supplemented by a more extensive 
introduction-an introduction which could 
address questions about the relationship 
between the various articles the book con-
tains. To take but one example: If their 
approach entails, as it appears to, a variety 
of disparate models of the fallacies that do 
not synthesize, then should this not count as 
a mark against it? And if not, why not? I 
expect that Woods and Walton have inter-
esting things to say in response to such 
questions, but the issues raised by their gen-
eral approach do not receive much attention 
in the present collection, being the focus of 
only one of nineteen chapters (Chapter 17, 
which I discuss below). 
Perhaps the answer to such ruminations 
is another book that can take the themes of 
the present volume further and develop 
them in a more unified way. Such a volume 
would, I think, make a very major contribu-
tion to contemporary discussions of the 
fallacies. It WOUld, in particular, be useful 
to begin with a much more detailed account 
of the general approach that Woods and 
Walton have developed-an account which 
could incorporate a discussion of the 
general problems with fallacy theory, a 
definition of fallacy that encompasses the 
logical, psychological and epistemic points 
that Woods and Walton want to make, and a 
defense of the use of formalism in the analysis 
of fallacies. Given such an introduction, 
successive chapters could provide a unified 
account of each of the fallacies the present 
book discusses. The present volume 
contains, in contrast, a collection of over-
lapping articles which are pertinent to 
contemporary discussion, but not bound 
together as a unified force-a problem 
which may make it difficult to use the 
book as a textbook in any but the most 
advanced and most specific courses in 
informal logic. 
II 
Putting aside questions about the organ-
ization of the book and what it might have 
been, its most notable feature is the empha-
sis it places on the attempt to use various 
kinds of formalism in furthering an under-
standing of the fallacies. In the Introduc-
tion, Woods and Walton are very balanced, 
rejecting the suggestion that they are "fanat-
ical formalists" (p. xviii) and pointedly 
endorsing a methodological pluralism in 
studies ofthe fallacies. This healthy attitude 
being noted, it must still be said that Woods 
and Walton are, in this book, preoccupied 
with the attempt to use formal methods in 
their discussion of the fallacies. Walton's 
recent Inf()rmal Logic: A Handbook fl)f' 
Critical Argumentation' adopts, in contrast, 
a much less formal approach to hillacies. 
Critical Study o/Woods and Walton 101 
As it is the use of formalism which is the 
main distinguishing feature of this collec-
tion, I want to emphasize it in my discus-
sion. It may in this regard be helpful to put 
my own cards on the table. In particular, I 
should say that I am sympathetic to the 
claim that informal logicians have not paid 
enough attention to formal logic when they 
analyze informal inferences. My own senti-
ments favour an approach that sees formal 
and informal logic as endeavours which are 
more closely allied than usually assumed.' I 
think it is important to emphasize this point 
because I am going to offer a critique of the 
emphasis that Woods and Walton place on 
formalism, but flot because I think that such 
an emphasis is necessarily erroneous.6 On 
the contrary, I am inclined toward the for-
mal approach appropriately employed, but 
think that Woods and Walton have failed to 
vindicate it. 
In discussing the formal aspects of 
Woods and Walton's essays, we need sepa-
rate two questions that can be asked in this 
regard. The first is the question of whether 
their formal analyses of various kinds of 
arguments and fallacies are successful in 
the sense that they accurately represent the 
forms of argument and fallacy (ad baculum, 
composition and division, etc.) they are 
supposed to represent. The second is the 
question whether their formal accounts 
convincingly establish that these analyses 
should be of central concern to those whose 
prime interest is not formal logic, but the 
teaching and studying of the fallacies as 
they appear in everyday contexts. I will take 
the latter to be the central concern of infor-
mal logic, though even if this is a mistake it 
must at least be admitted that an emphasis 
on concrete examples and the applicability 
of logical theory have been hallmarks of 
informal logic as il has developed. It is in 
this regard worlh noting that Woods and 
Walton's emphasis on formalism is unu-
sual. and that much of the work on informal 
logic in the last twenty years has been 
spawned by a dissatist~lction with Ihe 1'01'-
l11al approach when it is applied III everyday 
reasoning. 
lO2 Leo Groarke 
It is important to see that the question 
whether Woods and Walton's analyses are 
formally successful is distinct from the 
question whether they demonstrate that 
these analyses should be a major concern of 
those interested in everyday reasoning. For 
even if they are formally accurate, it may 
still be asked why they should be of broader 
interest. The crux of my critique of Woods 
and Walton will be the claim that they do not 
provide a convincing answer to this ques-
tion. In lieu of such an answer, the formal 
analyses Woods and Walton propose lose 
much of their force even if they are formally 
accurate accounts of the arguments andfal-
lacies in question. Thus they may still be 
interesting from the point of view offormal 
logic, but only of very secondary interest 
from the point of view of informal logic 
-the domain which is, obviously, more rel-
evant to the present journal. 
In keeping with such considerations, we 
may distinguish two goals we might adopt 
when we propose a formal analysis of a fal-
lacy. On the one hand, we might say that for-
mal logic is an endeavour in its own right, 
and that the attempt to construct a formal (or 
even quasi-formal) account of the fallacies 
may be pursued as a problem in formal 
logic. Looked at from this point of view, the 
problem is essentially mathematical: the 
problem of constructing a formal system 
with features that mirror, in some important 
way, ordinary arguments as they relate to 
fallacies. Anyone interested in such prob-
lems will find a wealth of ideas in Woods 
and Walton-ideas that may inspire further 
work in formal logic. Particularly notewor-
thy is their constant recognition that a vari-
ety of formal systems are available for 
analysis and make many different tools (rel-
evance logic, modal logic. aggregate theory, 
and so on) available when one tries to cap-
ture informal reasoning. 
Given what has already been said there 
is, however, a second way in which we 
might approach questions about the possi-
bility of formalizing fallacies. If our con-
cern is the study of ordinary arguments in a 
way that emphasizes the practical applica-
tion of one's theory to concrete examples, 
then formal techniques are of major interest 
only to the extent that they further-and not 
merely formalize-our practical ability to 
deal with concrete arguments in ordinary 
contexts. Utility and applicability in everyday 
contexts is the mark of important theoretical 
advances from this point of view and forn1al 
analyses are of secondary interest pursued 
as ends in themselves. Without some signif-
icant payoff for our attempt to distinguish 
good and bad arguments in actual dis-
course, an attempt to construct a formal 
logic which roughly models particular 
forms of argument is not of major impor-
tance, though it remains a significant problem 
in a related discipline-viz., formal logic. 
Once we recognize the distinction 
between formal accounts of the fallacies 
pursued for formal and informal ends7, 
there are problems with any suggestion to 
the effect that Woods and Walton's essays 
demonstrate the relevance of formal logic to 
discussions in informal logic. For rather 
than recognize this distinction, they repeat-
edly ignore it, assuming that an analysis of 
the fallacies which has as its goal their accu-
rate formal representation must, assuming it 
is successful, be of central importance in 
informal logic. Let me once again empha-
size that I am not assuming that this is not 
the case. On the contrary, I think that such a 
view is closer to the mark than most infor-
mal logicians will admit. But this is beside 
the point. Injudging Woods and Walton, the 
important question is whether they demon-
strate the significance of formal results and 
this cannot be done by relying on an 
assumption to this effect. Thus questions 
about the significance of formal results in 
informal logic are open questions over 
which there is much dispute (on the ques-
tion of onus as it applies to this particular 
issue, see the discussion below).8 
Woods and Walton's most promising 
attempt to move beyond mere assumption is 
found in the essay "What is Informal 
Logic?"-included as Chapter 17 in the 
present book. Discussing the role of formal-
ism in understanding forms of ordinary 
argument, they say that they have "been 
impressed to discover two particular advan-
tages in the deployment of formal re-
sources. One is the provision of clarity and 
power of representation and definition .... The 
other is the provision of verification milieux 
for contested claims about various falla-
cies." (p. 224) This sounds promising, but 
these advantages are explicated in a way that 
makes them little more than the claim that 
formal accounts of the fallacies make their 
formal status and structure clearer and more 
easily understood. In contrast, there is no 
serious attempt to show that such accounts 
are practically useful or more applicable to 
concrete examples of ordinary arguments 
than alternative theoretical approaches. 
The claim that formal analysis provides 
"clarity and power of representation and 
definition" is said to be demonstrated by 
such formal considerations as the result that 
"circularity models well in Kripke's intui-
tionistic semantics, and that a reasonable 
notion of evidential cumulativeness is also 
there definable. Then, too, Burge's formal 
theory of aggregates furnishes one with a 
quite powerful (though not effective) com-
mand of part-whole relations and the theory 
of composition plainly benefits from this .... " 
(p. 224) The claim that formal analyses 
provide "verification milieux for contested 
claims about various fallacies" is said to be 
demonstrated by the fact that formal analyses 
of informal inference lead to the conclusion 
that "relevant logic is a better (perhaps only 
marginally better) logic of inference than 
classical logic, and perhaps, too, that classi-
cal logic is a better logic of entailment than 
relevant logic. Or, to take another example, 
. . . it may be concluded that the salient 
part-whole relation is not mereological (any 
more than it is set theoretic)." (p. 224) 
Even if such claims are true, they cannot 
show the informal logician qua informal 
logician that formal analysis clarities and 
advances the issues and concerns which are 
the subject of informal logic. Rather, the 
informal logician needs a demonstration 
that shows how formal mechanisms allow 
us to deal in a better, more interesting, and 
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more illuminating way with concrete exam-
ples of the kinds of ordinary arguments that 
are informal logic's subject matter. For the 
most part, this is something that Woods and 
Walton never provide. And even in cases 
where their analysis does have clear and 
interesting consequences for ordinary argu-
ments, the case for fonnalism is still not 
convincing, for the important points they 
make can be made without the formal sys-
tems they employ.9 
One cannot demonstrate the importance 
of formal analyses by saying and showing 
that particular formal systems can be used 
to modeL in a more or less accurate way, 
particular infonnal phenomena. Indeed, the 
assumption that this is all that is required to 
demonstrate the usefulness of formal logic 
begs the question, assuming that a success-
ful formal analysis forwards the practical 
understanding that is the goal of informal 
logic. In answer to this assumption, it may 
be said that such results may formalize, but 
not further, the theory of ordinary argument 
and be of interest to the formal rather than 
the informal logician. 
The assumption in favour of formal 
analysis that characterizes Woods and Wal-
ton's work is particularly evident when they 
summarize their account of informal logic. 
On pp. 227-28 they write: 
If this [the assumption that the principal 
content of informal logic is the fallacies lO] 
has been a tolerable assumption. then we 
have an answer to the question with which 
we began, "What is Informal Logic'?" Noth-
ing is. The theory ofthe t~lllacies is not logic 
[because it is "a branch of formal theory that 
is essentially extralogical in major respects" 
(p. 225) J. though it includes some logic . 
indeed quite a bit of logic; and the theory of 
the fallacies is not only at its best (IS (I formal 
theory. il is difticult 10 see how Ihe suppres-
sion of its formal character could leave a I"l'S-
idue fully deserving of the name of theory. 
Now. this is nol to deny til(l!. on a quite 
different interpretation of "informal". there 
do exbt perkctly legitimate and familiar 
instanccs of informal "In!.!i.:". An anal">!\ 
with mathcmatics might ~er\e the point ';;t 
hand. Mathemalics that is done in the usual. 
worl-aday way. Ihat is to sa\. III ordinar~ 
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mathematical English and prior to any 
axiomatic treatment is said to be informal 
mathematics .... 
But note, these enterprises do not pre-
clude the quite vigorous exercise of what we 
have been calling formal methods. On the 
contrary, they very much require such an 
exercise if they are to attain the generality or 
power that commands serious philosophical 
attention. 
It is hard to see how such remarks could be 
acceptable to anyone who is not already 
committed to the sentiment that formal 
analysis should be the goal oflogic. Among 
other things, they assume that logic must be 
understood as "a branch of formal theory"; 
that an interesting theory of informal logic 
must have a basis in formal analysis; that 
without the latter informal logic cannot 
attain the generality and power that com-
mands serious philosophical attention; and 
that we should adopt mathematics as a 
model of the kind of theory we should aim 
for in trying to develop a useful theory of 
ordinary arguments. 
But why should informal logicians 
accept the claim that the theory of the falla-
cies is not logic if it is not a fully fledged for-
mal theory? Or the claim that it must, at its 
best, be a formal theory? Or the claim that 
the suppression of its formal character can-
not leave a residue which deserves the name 
of theory? These are claims that many of the 
most influential informal logicians-
Govier, e.g.--question, yet I cannot find a 
place in Woods and Walton where such 
claims are defended (the proposed analogy 
with mathematics is something I will tum to 
shortly). 
What is needed to make Woods and 
Walton's claims convincing is a defense of 
these assumptions about the primacy of for-
mal theory that shows that we can better 
understand ordinary arguments by taking 
formal logic as our paradigm. But then we 
are back to the problem I noted earlier, for 
Woods and Walton do not provide any such 
defense, usually proposing their formal 
analyses without applying them to concrete 
examples of ordinary arguments. In cases 
where their analysis has important conse-
quences for informal logic, their claims do 
not depend on formalism. In other cases, it 
is even arguable that their formalism actu-
ally obscures the issues that are pertinent to 
informallogic. 1l 
One might try to answer this criticism 
by appealing to the mathematical analogy 
Woods and Walton have proposed. But the 
analogy also begs the question, assuming-
not proving-that informal logic must, like 
informal mathematics, be an analogue of 
some more respectable formal theory. But 
why should we believe that informal logic 
must adopt formal methods if it i~ to attain 
the generality or power that commands seri-
ous philosophical attention? There is a 
school of philosophy that portrays deontic 
logic as the goal of ethics, epistemic logic as 
the goal of epistemology, formal represen-
tations of the emotions as the goal of philo-
sophical analyses of the emotions, and so 
on, but it is much less influential than it once 
was and many contemporary philosophers 
have rebelled against it as too constricting, 
naive, and not applicable to the intricacies 
of real life situations. Even if one does not 
accept these criticisms, there are problems 
with the Woods and Walton assumption in 
favour of the mathematical analogy, for 
they at least owe us a discussion of such crit-
icisms and a much more substantial account 
of the reasons they think we should prefer 
formal to informal methods of analysis. 
III 
Having argued that Woods and Walton 
do not make a convincing case for formal 
methods in informal logic, I hasten to add 
that there is much of interest in what they 
have to say. Most obviously, their analyses 
are of interest to anyone interested in the 
attempt to construct formal representations 
of various aspects of informal reasoning. 
More importantly in the present context, 
some of their analyses have important con-
sequences for much broader issues. I want 
to illustrate the latter by turning to their 
account of ad baculum, but first I want to 
add something to my critique of their use of 
formal methods. 
So far, I have claimed that Woods and 
Walton fail to defend their commitment to 
the formal approach convincingly. One 
might, however, answer that this is a case of 
misplaced onus. Given a long history of the 
use of formal methods in logic as a discipline, 
it might be said that one can plausibly 
assume the relevance of fonnal methods and 
that the onus must be placed on those who 
reject them to defend this rejection. This 
makes a commitment to formalism a premise 
of inquiry rather than a conclusion of it, but 
such an attitude deserves some comment. 
In answer to such a stand, we might 
review some of the reasons one might doubt 
or at least question the use of formal meth-
ods in informal logic-reasons that create 
an onus that demands a defense of any such 
an approach. We have already noted that we 
no longer live in a time when the appropri-
ateness of the formal model can be 
assumed, but it is worth expanding on the 
reasons why this is so. In my estimation, the 
following doubts have, in particular, fueled 
questions about the usefulness of formalism 
in informal logic. 
Firstly, there are doubts that arise from 
the inaccessibility of formal methods, 
which assume a background in a technical 
discipline which is, on the face of it, unnec-
essary for an appreciation of good and bad 
ordinary arguments. Obviously, one can be 
a good reasoner in day to day contexts with-
out having studied mathematical logic-or 
a bad reasoner even if one has studied 
it-and this suggests that ordinary reason-
ing is a realm which is quite distinct from 
mathematical modes of reasoning. And this 
in turn suggests that one should be able to 
understand the difference between good 
and bad reasoning without having the tech-
nical training required by the formal 
approach. One might even argue that the 
formal approach is politically objectionable. 
making good reasoning the property of a very 
exclusionary group of technical experts. 12 
Putting aside such questions. it is worth 
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noting the various ways in which formal 
methods may not only not advance, but 
actually obscure or obstruct, the kind of 
understanding that is the goal of informal 
logic. To begin with, it might be said that a 
commitment to a formal approach may 
interfere with an understanding of informal 
inference just because it excludes alterna-
tive approaches that may be preferable. 
Consider, for example, Woods and Walton's 
account of petitio principii. It suggests-
correctly, I think-that the fallacy needs to 
be seen as an epistemic fallacy which is 
relative to the knowledge and views of 
particular individuals. One can try to cap-
ture this aspect of the fallacy by trying to 
construct an appropriate epistemic logic, 
but it seems simpler and more appropriate 
to appeal to rhetoric and its long and 
involved discussions of audience and the 
role it plays in argumentation. Given a pre-
occupation with formalism this is not, how-
ever, an avenue of investigation that Woods 
and Walton consider. 
In other cases, the complexity and 
sophistication of formal accounts of infor-
mal inference interfere with the kind of 
understanding which is necessary if one 
wants to distinguish good and bad reasoning 
in ordinary contexts. At their best, formal 
analyses do force us to think carefully about 
the nature of ordinary inferences. A deci-
sion in favour of the Stalnaker corner as a 
model for conditionals must, for example. 
be predicated on some careful thinking 
about the way that conditional inferences 
work in ordinary language-why they are 
or are not adequately represented by mate-
rial implication, for example. Especially in 
view of the elegance and simplicity of Stal-
naker's account, it seems reasonable to 
think that we can learn a great deal from 
such an analysis. But it is much more diffi-
cult. even in this case, to be sure that we Gill 
draw any substantive conclusions for inti.)r-
mal logic. On the contrary. it is hard to think 
of contexts where the Stalnaker analysis 
would allow us to make inferellces we 
would otherwise reject. espedally as SOI11(,-
one who do('s not acc('pt slIdl infen:nc('s 
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always has the option of rejecting the Stal-
naker system. It is our intuitions about ordi-
nary inferences which are, in the end, the 
basis of the formal accounts that we adopt, 
hence it is difficult (though not perhaps 
impossible) to overrule them. 
Whatever one thinks of Stalnaker con-
ditionals, such problems are greatly exacer-
bated when one pursues formal analyses of 
much greater complexity-complexity 
which makes it difficult to apply our ordi-
nary intuitions. In many cases, the end 
result is a move toward formal simplicity 
that loses sight of the informal inference it is 
supposed to capture. In Woods and Walton, 
one finds an example of such problems in 
their account of ad ignorantiam. Noting 
that they have some interesting things to say 
about ad ignorantiam, 13 it must still be said 
that problems arise when they attempt to 
develop a formal account of ad ignorantiam 
as it occurs in the context of onus of proof. 
Here their discussion focuses on the follow-
ing example: 
The simplest scenario is where we might 
have a debate between Mr. X and Mr. Y, and 
Mr. X at some point in the debate aggres-
sively asserts that p. Then later in the debate 
Mr. X may aggressively demand that Mr. Y 
produce evidence of the negation of p, in a 
case where Mr. Y has expressed or implied 
disbelief that p obtains .... In this case it 
may be quite unreasonable, even fallacious, 
for X to insist that Y produce evidence for 
p's negation. Since Mr. X originally asserted 
that p, it would seem that the obligation is his 
to marshall evidence inp's behalf. (p. 166) 
Woods and Walton propose that one deal 
with such cases by appealing to formal 
games that can be used to model discussion 
in a dialogue. 
A dialectical game that begins to capture the 
ad ignorantiam suggested by the simple 
scenario above requires a rule allowing the 
questioner to put forward r Why p? 1 without 
requiring that his question be open to the 
same sorts of justitication procedures cover-
ing the case of the rcspondent who opts to 
assert one of the pair {p, "'p J in response to a 
question. For this simplest case, the kind of 
mechanism requircd is illustrated by a syn-
tactical rule in Hamblin's "Why-Because-
Systems-With-Questions" ... [Woods and 
Walton go on to elaborate a particular rule, 
S3]. Transparent attempts to shift the burden 
of proof unfairly, as in the scenario we con-
sidered earlier, can now be classed as viola-
tions of S3. For example, the following 
specimen of dialogue between a and b is 
barred by syntax rule S3 [because it does not 
allow a participant in the dialogue to answer 
a question of the form "Why X?" with the 
question "Why ..,X'!"]. 
b: WhyS? 
a: Why"'S? 
... The simplest cases of ad ignorantiam can 
[thus 1 be carefull y understood as syntactical 
aberrations of dialectic. (p. 167) 
This treatment suggests that the case in 
question is understood and adequately 
accounted for given that it can now be 
understood as a violation of one of the rules 
(S3) within a particular formal game. More 
complex cases will require more complex 
formal systems but are, in principle, to be 
treated in a similar way. 
Some reflection on questions of onus in 
ordinary contexts shows that there are seri-
ous problems with this account. Rule S3 
implies that the burden of proof in a dia-
logue is a function of the order in which 
claims and questions are proposed. In the 
scenario Woods and Walton discuss, it does 
not allow Mr. X to shift the burden of proof 
to Mr. Y because Mr. Y has asked "Why p?" 
and cannot, therefore, be answered with the 
question "Why "'p?". But if Mr X had been 
quicker to the mark and asked Mr. Y "Why 
"'p?" first, then the same rule bars Mr. Y 
from asking "Why p?". One way to prevail 
in a dialogue which is structured in this way 
will be to ask, as quickly as possible, one's 
interlocutor to defend hislher commit-
ments, for this creates an onus which cannot 
be reversed. Assuming straightforward 
rules in a dialogue, it will in most cases be 
possible for the first person who issues such 
a challenge to undermine any argument 
their interlocutor provides by repeatedly 
creating a new onus on the part of their 
interlocutor, asking questions of the form 
"Why p?" where p is any proposition which 
is not a theorem. 
Clearly, something has gone wrong 
with this analysis. Onus depends on some-
thing more than the order in which claims 
are made and evidence is asked for in a dia-
logue. We can get some idea of what it 
depends on if we consider an example. Sup-
pose then that the proposition p that Mr. X 
has asserted in Woods and Walton's initial 
scenario is the proposition "Genocide is 
wrong." Suppose then that, as the scenario 
suggests, Mr. Y demands a defense of p, 
asking why he should believe that this is so. 
Mr. X might answer with an explanation, 
but he could also reasonably ask of Mr. Y 
why he imagines otherwise. Genocide 
seems obviously wrong and morally odi-
ous; why then should we believe otherwise? 
In asking such questions, Mr. X reverses the 
onus, violating S3 and committing what 
Woods and Walton suggest as a likely fal-
lacy. But this is a case where the reversal of 
onus does not seem unreasonable, just 
because the content of the statement Mr. X 
makes puts an onus on anyone who thinks 
otherwise-anyone who thinks that geno-
cide is permissible-to defend their point of 
view. This and many similar examples we 
could easily concoct show that onus 
depends not on the order in which claims 
and questions are proposed, but on the 
inherent plausibility or implausibility or the 
content of the claims in question. 
This is not the place to work out a 
detailed account of onus or the notion of 
plausibility this implies, especially as it is a 
complex notion fraught with philosophical 
questions and it is arguable that what is 
plausible varies from context to context and 
audience to audience. In the present con-
text, it is enough to note that such considera-
tions undermine the tidy formal analysis 
Woods and Walton approach, and that it is 
informal issues of this sort-not the devel-
opment of elaborate formal games-which 
are the key to sorting out onus in ordinary 
arguments. 
One could, of course, try to formalize 
the account of onus I have just suggested. 
The rules of a formal dialogue might, for 
example, allow "Why -8'1" as an answer to 
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the question "Why S?" just in case S was a 
member of a set of statements we might call 
the "onus-free" set, call it O. For every dia-
logue, 0 might be specified as some set of 
statements such that, for every statement S, 
Sl & S2, ",,(SEO & ""SEO) and [(SEO & 
SlEO) & «S&Sl)~S2)]~S2EO. Intui-
tively this means that a set of inherently 
plausible claims and their consequences 
can be specified in every dialogue, and that 
it is possible to reverse the onus whenever a 
defense of them is asked for. With the addi-
tion of appropriate rules it should be possi-
ble to allow a situation where onus can 
sometimes be reversed even in the case of 
these inherently plausible claims-the for-
mal analogue of a situation where some-
thing is initially plausible, but loses its 
plausibility owing to further considerations. 
I will not, however, pursue such matters 
here. I think they are interesting, but it is 
much more difficult to say whether this par-
ticular aspect of formal theory will advance 
our understanding of onus in a way that is of 
primary importance for informal logic. On 
the contrary, it might be said that it needs a 
discussion that goes beyond formal matters, 
determining what kind of content decides 
the inherent plausibility of claims-and 
thus onus-in day to day arguments. At the 
very least, the problems with Woods and 
Walton's analysis stand as a warning to any-
one who wants to develop an analysis of 
onus which is very far removed from con-
crete arguments in ordinary contexts. 
IV 
So far, I have focused my discussion on 
the emphasis Woods and Walton place on 
formal analyses of the fallacies. This seems 
to me the focus of their book and the most 
important issue that it raises. But it is impor-
tant to add that Woods and Walton havc 
many interesting things to say about other 
aspects of fallacy theory. Their suggestion 
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that a fallacy is an invalid argument which 
seems otherwise is, to begin with, a useful 
one, keeping fallacy theory squarely in the 
bounds of logic, all the while admitting that 
it has an important psychological compo-
nent (see, e.g., pp. 86-87).14 As they point 
out, a more psychological approach--one 
that sees a fallacy as an argument which is 
used unscrupulously, for example-makes 
fallacies a function of vague, relative, and 
difficult to determine states of mind. 
Whether a particular piece of reasoning 
counts as a fallacy is, of course, subjective 
to some extent and will differ depending on 
the context, but this can best be dealt with by 
adopting some form of the Woods and Wal-
ton suggestion that fallacies be analyzed as 
epistemic phenomena. Petitio principii can, 
for example, be most usefully seen as a fal-
lacy that must be judged from the point of 
view of a particular epistemic context-
from the point of view of what we know and 
do not know. As I have already suggested, 
one way to develop such an approach is by 
judging such fallacies from the point of 
view of the beliefs and knowledge of a par-
ticular audience. 
In addition to their interesting points 
about fallacies in general, Woods and 
Walton offer stimulating discussions of 
standard treatments of the fallacies. In some 
cases, this includes the discussion of histor-
ically important analyses, as when they dis-
cuss the illuminating view of composition 
and division one finds in medieval philoso-
phy. As they point out repeatedly, standard 
treatments of the fallacies carelessly group 
together very different kinds of arguments 
and claims, some of which are valid and 
appropriate. My own view is that their 
analyses provide a basis that could be used 
to construct a more positive typology of 
ordinary arguments--one that distinguishes 
different forms of good rather than falla-
cious inference-though this is something 
that is still to come. In the present context, 
the important point is that they convinc-
ingly critique traditional accounts of the fal-
lacies. Some of these accounts are not as 
common now as when their articles were 
originally published, but it can still be said 
that Woods and Walton show that tradi-
tional accounts of ad hominem, ad verecun-
diam, ad populum and many questions are 
unacceptable, for there are occasions where 
attacks on an individual's reliability, appeals 
to authority, appeals to popular sentiment, 
and the asking of loaded questions are not 
logically--or otherwise-unacceptable. 
The chapter of the book I like the most is 
Chapter 4, "Ad Baculum." It can serve to 
illustrate some of the interesting things that 
Woods and Walton have to say about partic-
ular fallacies. As they note in their introduc-
tion to this fallacy: "Most texts treating of 
the fallacies include a section on the ad bac-
ulum. in which it is lamented that we should 
so often turn to the sword instead of the pen 
as a means of persuasion. Our concern will 
be whether such threats can be said to con-
stitute instances of a logical fallacy. The 
weight of evidence persuades us that the 
answer is, 'No'." (p. 47) The basis of this 
answer is a critique of textbook analyses of 
the fallacy which notes a variety of prob-
lems that undermine them. 
The first problem Woods and Walton 
note is a tendency to ascribe the fallacy ad 
baculum to threats which are not argu-
ments, hence improperly called fallacious. 
As they say of the typical example "Shut 
your face or I'll kick it in": 
Its untowardnesses are multiple-in vary-
ing contexts it might be illegal, immoral or 
undiplomatic, and it is certainly impolite-
but what logical sin does it commit? A suc-
cinct and pointed answer is that from the 
logical point of view this is not an 
argument-much less a correct or incorrect 
argument-it is a threat. And there is a syn-
tactical initiation of the point: one of its con-
stituent sentences is neither true nor false, 
not a declarative sentence at all, but an 
imperative .... Much the same can be said 
for many typical text-book examples of the 
ad baculum. (p. 48) 
As Woods and Walton write of Copi's 
analysis of the fallacy: "Copi writes that the 
fallacy of ad baculum is committed when 
force is used to cause a person to accept a 
conclusion [40, p. 74]. But where is the 
argument here? If I point a revolver at your 
temple to win your acceptance of my view, 
what premiss do I advance? Again. I might 
use 'force' to cause you to accept or believe 
a conclusion, if I subject you to brainwash-
ing or brain surgery, yet not advance an 
argument or commit a fallacy, or breach of 
argument at all." (p. 53) 
One might criticize such suggestions by 
arguing that the kind of threat in 
question-"Shut your face or I'll kick it," 
for example-implicitly is or at least could 
be a constituent of an argument with the 
conclusion "You should shut your face." I 
will discuss such suggestions shortly, but 
we should first note that one might answer 
Woods and Walton in a more general way, 
rejecting the notion of fallacy their analysis 
depends on. Instead of defining a fallacy as 
a faulty argument one might, for example, 
simply say that a fallacy is something that 
one should not do in the context of an 
argument. And, assuming that one 
shouldn't issue threats in an argument, one 
might then conclude that the instances of ad 
baculum in question should count as cases 
of a fallacy. 
There are, however, two problems with 
such suggestions. Firstly, they are problem-
atic because they are predicated on a sim-
plistic view of the morality of threats. In 
normal contexts, it does seem that threats 
are inappropriate, but it is easy to imagine 
cases where they are not only permissible, 
but obligatory-cases where the only way 
to prevent some wrong, say a rape or an 
assault, is by issuing a nasty threat. It imme-
diately follows that one cannot say that 
threats are never appropriate in argumenta-
tive contexts, and that this account of ad 
baculum is unsatisfactory. 
Secondly, and more deeply, an expan-
sion of the notion of fallacy that encom-
passes whatever is inappropriate in 
argumentative contexts expands the notion 
so much that it seems unmanageable. 
Indeed, it is hard to see what it doesn't 
cover. Clearly, such an expanded notion 
incorporates, for example, very complex 
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questions of ethics and even etiquette. 
These questions do have some bearing on 
the understanding of informal inferences 
that is the goal of informal logic and 
argumentation theory, but the kind of 
expertise they require is something that 
seems to place them for the most part in a 
different discipline. As Woods and Walton 
write: "[W]e have suggested that one needs 
to take a fairly liberal view of argument if 
one is to deal effectively with the fallacies. 
since narrowly alethic or classical proof-
theoretical representations of argument are 
not nearly rich enough to capture the 
required nuances. Many fallacies are in fact 
essentially epistemic or dialectical. But it 
would be ungeometrical if not inflationary 
not to draw the line somewhere." (p. 47) 
And once we agree to draw the line some-
where, it seems unreasonable to include as 
fallacious claims that do not even count as 
arguments. 
Taking a fallacy to be a fallacious argu-
ment, we may tum to the suggestion that the 
standard instances of ad baculum are falla-
cies, because they are fallacious arguments 
with some prudential conclusion of the 
form "You should do such and such." But 
then the problem is that, as Woods and Wal-
ton point out, such arguments need not be 
invalid, Putting aside the formal mechanism 
they use to illustrate this, the inferences 
(I) Either I'm right or you don'ttake the car 
tonight. Therefore r m right. 
(2) If it's your move I'll quit. Therefore it's 
my move. 
are valid from a prudential point of view 
(from the point of view of what we should 
accept) if we do assume that "you don't take 
the ear tonight" and ''I'll quit" are events 
you very much want to avoid. Making this 
assumption, it is in each case only by 
accepting the proposed conclusion that our 
prudential interests can be served. It follows 
that "paradigm examples of the fallacy ... 
come out of what seemed all appropriate 
fragment of semanticalmClchinery as valid 
arguments." But: "What then has happened 
to the fallacy,?" (p. 50) 
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In answer to this question, Woods and 
Walton turn to Alex Michalos's suggestion 
that ad baculum occurs when an arguer con-
fuses the claim that "some kind of force is 
going to be applied unless a certain view is 
accepted" with the question whether that 
view is true (p. 51). If this kind of confusion 
is the case, then ad baculum "would indeed 
be a fallacy, an egregious one at that," but 
surely Woods and Walton are right when 
they suggest that it is hard to see why such a 
fallacy should be called ad baculum. "This 
fallacy, as virtually all writers agree, consists 
in the threat offorce or violence," but it is 
not the threat itself, but the confusion of the 
prudential conclusion it establishes with the 
conclusion that something is true which is 
the crux of the fallacious reasoning on the 
proposed account (p. 51). And there is, of 
course, no reason why the threat could not 
occur without this confusion and hence with-
out constituting an actual ad hominem. We 
need only imagine that the person issuing the 
threat is logically clear headed and does not 
make the equivocation Michalos suggests. 
It is, I think, useful to add that one 
might see ad baculum as a different 
equivocation-an equivocation that con-
fuses the prudential "should" with a moral 
or rational "should." This, I think, is the 
point behind most textbook analyses of the 
fallacy, which look askance at the apparent 
suggestion that a threat of force can be used 
to establish the morality or the rationality of 
the conclusion that one should act or believe 
in a certain way (taking rationality to be 
something distinct from prudence). That 
this is a mistake can be seen from the obvious 
fact that someone threatening to kick your 
face in if you do not write down that you 
accept my conclusions in this study cannot 
establish the moral or the rational force of 
my conclusions, though it could establish 
this as a prudent course of action-
assuming the person in question was not the 
diminutive size I am, was standing next to 
you with a huge sledge hammer, etc. 
Once again, the problem is that a threat 
of force need not commit any such equivo-
cation. On the contrary, those using the 
kinds of arguments typically labeled ad 
baculum might wholeheartedly agree that 
they have not established a moral or a 
rational warrant for the course of action 
they prescribe-pointing out that they want 
one to do something regardless. This is true 
even in cases where the proposed course of 
action is the morally correct one-say 
refraining from a rape. The point, it might 
be said, is to stop the rape, not to rationally 
or morally establish that this is appropriate 
(though this can be established by other 
kinds of arguments). So once again the 
charge of ad baculum seems to miss the 
point: prudential conclusions on the basis of 
considerations offorce can be logically jus-
tified provided they are not confused with 
something else. 
The analysis of ad baculum Woods and 
Walton present finishes by noting the psy-
chological power of appeals to force, grant-
ing that they can playa very significant role 
in changing and establishing belief. But as 
they suggest: "We are getting now to the 
heart of ad baculum, but from the logical 
point of view it is the heart of darkness. 
True, the use of the appeal to fear is an 
important aspect of the psychology of 
belief-modification, of propaganda and the 
influence of opinion [135]. But the study of 
the emotional factors in the modification of 
beliefs is the province of psychology, not of 
logic." (pp. 52-53) 
It seems reasonable to assent to Woods 
and Walton's concluding paragraph: 
So far, we do not appear to have found any 
genuine instances of the ad baculum. To 
meet the requirements for an instance of ad 
baculum, a sequence would have to be (i) an 
argument, (ii) a fallacious or incorrect argu-
ment, and (iii) a threat or appeal to force. It 
may be possible to produce something that 
would meet all three requirements, but we 
will not scruple to say that it would take the 
rationality of a Tertullian commingled with 
the black power of a Svengali actually to 
pull the thing off-actually to commit the 
fallacy of ad baculum. Needless to say, ours 
is a conjecture quite at odds with the usual 
treatment of ad baculum in the texts, by 
which the fallacy is no rara avis. But until 
the thing is produced, we remain uncon-
vinced. (p. 53) 
v 
In conclusion, let me reiterate that this is 
a useful book which should spark some 
interesting discussion-in particular, some 
much-needed discussion of the role of for-
mal anal ysis in informal logic and argumen-
tation theory and the relationship between 
formal and informal logic. Too often, prac-
titioners in both fields proceed with little 
knowledge of what their disciplinary cous-
Critical Study of Woods and Walton III 
ins are up to, yet firmly committed to the 
primary importance of their own endeav-
ours. I have already argued that there are 
problems with Woods and Walton's defense 
of their commitment to formal analysis, but 
it should still raise much-needed comment 
and response. 
In closing, it should be said that Woods 
and Walton's essays are also useful because 
of what they have to say about specific falla-
cies, and the fallacies in general. Though 
these essays were published ten to twenty 
years ago, it is a mark of their longevity that 
they remain pertinent to many aspects of 
contemporary discussion. 15 
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